R. Ramanujam, professeur à l’IMSc – Institute of Mathematical Sciences de Chennai, en Inde, avec un exposé intitulé "Logical dynamics in large games".
How would you strategize in a game with say, 50 players? If the game were repeated many times, and you saw that your neighbour was doing well in several previous rounds, would you be tempted to imitate that neighbour in the next round ? Would that be rational on your part? In games with a large number of players, outcomes are associated not with the actual tuple of strategies chosen by players but with the distribution of what fraction of players choose which move. The pattern of reasoning in such games is different from those in which all players know each others' types. We discuss Nash equilibria, and some logical / automata theoretic formulations of stability in such games.
Ramanujam got his ph.d. in theoretical computer science from the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai. After a post-doctoral stint in New York, he joined the Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, where he is currently professor.His research interests are in mathematical and philosophical logics and their applications to theory of distributed systems, game theory and security theory.He is on the editorial board of ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, and has been actively involved in the Indian Association for Research in Computing Science as well as the Association for Logic in India.